

The Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology

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Anthony Kenny has, over the last half a century, been one of the leading Wittgenstein scholars in the world, and one of the pioneers in applying Wittgenstein's ideas and methods to novel domains and problems. I was fortunate to have met Tony when I was a Junior Research Fellow at Balliol more than forty years ago. The depth of his thought, the breadth of his knowledge, the clarity and incisiveness of his writings have inspired me throughout my professional life. In his paper 'Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Mind', Tony was the first to delve beneath the surface of the *Tractatus* to disclose the hidden philosophico-psychological presuppositions of the book.¹ The following essay, a small token of gratitude for all that I have learnt from Tony, begins from the same point and tells the subsequent tale of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology.

1. *Prolegomenon*

An overview of Wittgenstein's engagement with problems in the philosophy of psychology must start with the very beginning of his philosophical career, not because we can find there early reflections on the subject, but rather because we find there an array of relatively unreflective presuppositions. These are of interest for two reasons. First, they form the well-concealed psychological hinterland of the logic and metaphysics of symbolism of the *Tractatus*. So they shed light on the book. Secondly, these presuppositions were largely misconceived and became the target of Wittgenstein's critical investigations in the 1930s. The themes – meaning something, wanting, intending, understanding, explaining the meaning of an expression, knowing what an expression means, believing things to be so – in effect provided Wittgenstein's gateway into investigations into the philosophy of psychology.

When Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929, the psychological presuppositions that characterized his early work only gradually came under scrutiny. That is not surprising. Locating the roots of one's thought and then pulling them up is no easy matter. *The Big Typescript* was an early attempt to weld his new philosophy into a unified whole that would both confront the errors and misconceptions of the *Tractatus* and elaborate his new ideas on the nature of language and linguistic representation. These attempts continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s with the *Umarbeitung*, the *Zweite Umarbeitung*, *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*, and the four different drafts of the *Philosophical Investigations* that preoccupied him until 1946/7. Here, in his second masterwork, we find a sustained engagement with the subjects of understanding, privacy of experience, the impossibility of a private language the nominata of which are supposedly 'private' experiences, expressions ('Äusserungen') of the 'inner', thinking, imagination and mental images, mind and behaviour, the first-person pronoun, consciousness, intentionality, memory and recognition, the will and voluntary action, intention, and meaning something. Most of these have a direct bearing on the central themes of the book. But with regard to others, such as the nature of psychological investigation, of mental states, recognition, voluntariness and the will, and the nature of intention (the remarks on which were all added only in the final draft), Wittgenstein's interest

¹ A. J. P. Kenny, 'Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Mind', repr. in his *The Legacy of Wittgenstein* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984), pp. 1-9.

was caught by these topics in their own right.

In 1946 Wittgenstein turned explicitly to investigations in philosophy of psychology. The last lecture courses he gave as professor at Cambridge in 1946-7 were on the philosophy of psychology, and from April 1946 until March 1949, he bent his efforts to explorations in this domain. The results were the MSS volumes 130-138, comprising some 1900 pages of notes. A selection from these, completed in October 1947, was dictated to form TS 229, since published as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, volume 1. A further selection was dictated to form TS 232, completed in October 1948, and since published as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, volume 2. These selections are not re-ordered or arranged – they are merely a sifting of material in chronological order.² The second half of MS 137 and the whole of MS 138, written between October 1948 and March 1949, and now published as *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, volume 1, were not made into a typescript. But in the spring of 1949 Wittgenstein made a handwritten selection of remarks – the loose-leaf folder MS 144 – which formed the basis for the lost typescript (TS 234) of what was published in 1953 as Part 2 of the *Investigations*. This contains 370 remarks, the large majority from MSS 137-8. It is doubtful whether this compilation was meant to be a part of the *Investigations*, and more probable that it was intended as a preliminary stage of a larger volume on the philosophy of psychology. Wittgenstein may have made the selection and dictated the typescript primarily to take it with him to America in the summer of 1949 in order to show his recent work to Norman Malcolm.³

The 1900 pages of notes on the philosophy of psychology to some extent form a new departure for Wittgenstein, at least in the following sense. The *Investigations* is a Janus-faced book. On the one hand, it looks back critically to the *Tractatus* and the philosophical tradition of which Wittgenstein conceived it to be the culmination and termination. On the other hand, it goes over similar ground in a wholly novel way, advancing very different solutions to a wide range of problems concerning the nature of language, meaning and linguistic representation. The subsequent writings on philosophical psychology do not have this counterpoint. Moreover, the style of the remarks is much less dialogical than in the *Investigations*. The author is no longer talking to an imaginary interlocutor, but, if to anyone at all, then to himself. The therapeutic note is much muted; and conceptual geography is everywhere evident. There is no systematic confrontation with his earlier self or with a great

² He did, however, cut up one copy of TSS 229 and 232 into slips, and preserved 369 of them for future use. This collection of cuttings, together with cuttings from other typescripts, has been published as *Zettel*.

³ Von Wright ('The Troubled History of Part II of the *Investigations*', *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 42 (1992), 181-192) relates that on 18 February 1949 Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm that he was planning to dictate materials that he had been working on since the autumn of 1948 and would send Malcolm a copy. In March Malcolm invited Wittgenstein to visit him in Cornell. Wittgenstein accepted the invitation. So he never sent Malcolm a typescript, but brought with him the typescript made in early July 1949 from MS 144 in order to show Malcolm later that month (see N. Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein – A Memoir*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 66.). It is noteworthy that the discussion in which Wittgenstein told Rhees and Anscombe that he intended to suppress a good deal of the last 30 pages of the *Investigations* and to work 'what is in Part II, with further material, into its place' (PI, Editors' note) took place in Dublin in December 1948, *before* he had written MS 144, and six months before he had dictated it. It is, therefore, impossible to ascertain what he may have had in mind. The hypothesis that his writings were intended as preliminary work for a projected volume on the philosophy of psychology is, of course, perfectly compatible with the idea of modifying and adding *some* of the new material to the discussions of PI §§571-693 on expectation, belief, recognition, voluntariness, intention and meaning something.

tradition in the manner in which Augustine's picture of language provides the *mis-en-scène*, and the Augustinian conception of language a muted leitmotif, for the *Investigations*. The *Tractatus* is barely mentioned, and there are but few references, explicit or implicit, to his previous views. Few other writers are alluded to, although James is often used as a stalking horse, and Köhler and Gestalt psychology are subjected to criticism. Rather, what we find is a painstaking *exploration* of language games with psychological concepts. Many different concepts are investigated, patterns of similarity and difference are painstakingly teased out, and conceptual connections described. The tone is tentative. We see Wittgenstein applying the methods of philosophical analysis that he had developed over the previous sixteen years. Direct remarks on philosophy in general – so common in his earlier notes – are rare. That seems to be a subject that has now been settled and about which he has no further qualms. But there are numerous reflections on methodology in philosophical psychology as Wittgenstein struggles to determine his goal and to find his way. Although these writings are incomplete and unpolished, we can learn much about how he thought problems in philosophical psychology should be handled. That in turn sheds light on his general conception of philosophy and philosophical method.

In the following I shall survey the evolution of Wittgenstein's engagement with philosophy of psychology, and essay an overview of his conception of the subject.

2. *The psychological hinterland of Wittgenstein's early philosophy*

Anti-psychologism was increasingly common in Germany (e.g. Lotze) and Britain (e.g. the Absolute Idealists) towards the end of the nineteenth century. Wittgenstein inherited this methodological commitment from both Frege and Russell. As he put it bluntly, 'psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science' (TLP 4.121), and he noted that his study of sign-language corresponds to the study of thought processes which philosophers used to consider essential for the philosophy of logic, and that he must take care not to get entangled in inessential psychological investigations.⁴ The central subject of the *Tractatus* – the nature of the proposition and the logico-metaphysical consequences that flow from its essential nature⁵ – can and should be handled without reference to psychological considerations. For something *is* a proposition only insofar as it is meant and understood. So since, from a logical point of view, propositions are given, then meaning and understanding, qua psychological acts or processes, drop out of any *logical* considerations. Consequently, the psychological presuppositions of the book are largely tacit, and are made clear only by Wittgenstein's notebooks and correspondence. The following five points can be gleaned from these: 1. Excluding psychological considerations seemed to licence avoiding reflection on psychological *concepts*. That meant taking for granted a range of unexamined preconceptions concerning meaning something, understanding and thinking. These were anything but trivial or innocuous. Hence Wittgenstein's later remark in the *Investigations* §81, 'All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning (*meinen*), and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me [in MS 142, §78, he added here 'Log. Phil. Abh.']) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it, he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.'

2. In 1915, Wittgenstein wrote: 'Names are necessary for an assertion that *this* thing

⁴ Presumably he meant the investigation of the psychological nature of judgement, the difference between entertaining a proposition and believing it to be true, the nature of ideas and the differences between affirming and denying one idea of another, and so forth.

⁵ An early title Wittgenstein proposed for the book was *Der Satz*.

possesses *that* property and so on. They link the propositional form with quite definite objects. And if the general description of the world is like a stencil of the world, the names pin it to the world so that the world is wholly covered by it' (NB 53). *How* are names connected to their meanings? The correlation of a name and its meaning, he had claimed in his 'Notes on Logic' in 1913, is *psychological* (NB 104). In 1915, he averred that it is *the speaker* who correlates the components of the picture with objects (NB 33f.) How then did Wittgenstein conceive of the mechanism of correlation effected by the user of a name?

3. Names have a meaning only in the context of a proposition, just as the toy cars and figures in the Paris lawcourt stand for specific cars and people only when they are arranged in a representation of the traffic accident under consideration, and not when the little cars and figures are put back in their boxes. One projects a state of affairs into a representing fact, and the elements of the representing fact stand for the elements of the state of affairs represented. The method of projection is 'to think the sense of the proposition' (TLP 3.11; or 'thinking the sense of the propositional sign' PTLP. 3.12-3.13). The sense of a proposition is (roughly) the (possible) state of affairs it represents⁶, and thinking the sense of a proposition is, I suggest, *intending* or *meaning* BY the proposition (the sentence in use) *that* state of affairs. In so doing, one *means* by the constituent names of the proposition the constituent objects of the state of affairs meant. So it is the speaker's meaning (*meinen*) that correlates names with objects that are their meanings (*Bedeutungen*) (A corollary of this conception, not mentioned in the *Tractatus*, is that all understanding of the discourse of others is interpreting.)

This account of Wittgenstein's ideas has been challenged on the grounds that it takes for granted that 'thinking the sense of a proposition' is a 'mental proceeding' that constitutes the method of projection.⁷ This is mistaken. It does not take any such thing for granted. It relies on Wittgenstein's assertion that the correlation of a name and its meaning is psychological (NB 104), that names link the propositional form with quite definite objects (NB 53), and that it is 'By my correlating the components of the picture with objects, [that] it comes to represent a situation and to be right or wrong' (NB 33f.). The interpretation is strengthened by the fourth general point:

4. Explicitly in the *Notebooks* and implicitly in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein argued that propositions that appear to be vague in their surface grammar are actually determinate, or at least determinately indeterminate, in their depth grammar. A proposition like 'The book is lying on the table' appears vague, since it appears indeterminate what exactly counts as 'lying on', and hence the proposition might seem to lack any determinate truth value. However, the speaker means *something* by the sentence, 'and as much as we *certainly* mean, must surely be clear' (NB 67). What the speaker means may be a disjunction of possibilities, but each of the disjuncts must be sharp. So all indeterminacy is determinately indeterminate. Indeed, the speaker is at least sometimes in a position to assert 'I *know* what I mean; I mean just THIS (pointing to the appropriate complex with my finger)' (NB 70).

The interpretation is clinched by the fact that when Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in 1929, he continued for a while to conceive of intending or meaning (*meinen*) as the method of projection whereby a state of affairs is projected into a proposition. In MS 108, 218f. he wrote:

... can the intention be an external relation?

⁶ Strictly speaking it is the agreement and disagreement of the proposition with the obtaining and non-obtaining of the state of affairs it represents (cf. TLP 4.2).

⁷ See Cora Diamond, 'Peter Winch on the *Tractatus* and the Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy', in A. Pichler and S. Säätelä eds. *Wittgenstein: the Philosopher and his Work* (Bergen, Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 2005), pp. 147.

Because the intention brings it about that this process is a picture which gets confirmed or disconfirmed and because this constitutes the real essence of intention, therefore the intention can be no [external] relation of the picture to something else. I see before me how the thought – the meant sentence (*gemeinte Satz*) – reaches right up to reality, i.e. already models its form in advance. As does the ruler, or perhaps just two gradation marks on it, with which reality is now especially compared?

One could say that the intention is the method of projection.

The picture (in the narrower sense) does not suffice because how it is to be compared with reality is not given with it. Together with it must be the method of projection; but then the picture indeed reaches right into the place where the object (*Gegenstand*)⁸ of the picture is.

It is the intention that determines what is *meant* and that transforms a mere sign into a representation of a possibility that may or may not be actualized. In MS 109, 218, he wrote ‘An intention sets a standard against which the fact can be judged’, so it is by meaning or intending the sign to represent a certain state of affairs that the sign becomes a true-or-false-picture. In his lectures in Lent Term 1930, he remarked: ‘The proposition is a picture’, but not a picture by resemblance, like a portrait, but rather ‘something which is *intended* to be a picture of another [*sic*] without resembling it ... That it is a picture consists in the intention’ (LWL 4). In MS 145, 49f. (written in 1933) he discusses the manner in which we are prone to think of intention as giving life to the sign. It is, I think, plausible to view this as being also an articulation of how he himself had once thought:

By “intention” I here mean what thinks the sign, what directs the sign, what gives it meaning⁹, what makes the sign fulfil its function, what uses the sign in thought.

Intention seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation.

5. The last commitment to which I want to draw attention is patent in the letter to Russell of 19 August, 1919. In response to Russell’s question about what the constituents of a thought are and what their relation is to the components of the pictured fact, Wittgenstein replies ‘I don’t know *what* the constituents of the thought are but I know *that* it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language.¹⁰ Again, the kind of relation of the constituents of thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find out.’ Further, to Russell’s query of whether a *Gedanke* consists of words, Wittgenstein responds: ‘No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don’t know’ (CL 69).

This expresses a highly problematic idea of a ‘language of thought’, which Wittgenstein was later to assail. It also poses a destructive dilemma: if thought constituents stand to the constituents of depicted facts in the same relation as words, then they are not ‘intrinsically representational’, and a further explanation – an interpretation – is required to link them to their meanings. Words, as we have just seen, are conceived to be linked to their meanings by *thinking*, namely: by thinking the sense of the sentence that expresses the

⁸ ‘Gegenstand’ here could be translated either as ‘subject’ or ‘object’, and which of them one opts for affects the sense of the passage. I believe that what Wittgenstein had in mind was the state of affairs (the possibility) of which the thought is a picture. Whether that ‘logical place’ is ‘occupied’, i.e. whether the state of affairs obtains or not, determines whether the thought is true or false.

⁹ ‘*Meinung*’, rather than ‘*Bedeutung*’. It is used here in an Anglicism that is common in Wittgenstein’s later writings, to signify meaning something. What he has in mind in this remark is: that in virtue of which something is meant by the sign..

¹⁰ It is *this* kind of anankastic pronouncement that Wittgenstein later meant when he castigated himself for ‘dogmatism’ in the *Tractatus* (WWK 182ff.), and not, as has recently been suggested, remarks about how words are used, or grammatical statements of rules for the use of words.

thought, i.e. meaning by the sentence the state of affairs it represents, and hence meaning by the names the constituents of the state of affairs represented. But thoughts cannot be linked to what they are thoughts of by further acts of thinking, for then thought would not be 'the last interpretation', which it must be. On the other hand, if they are 'intrinsically representational', then they do not stand to their meanings in the same relation as words. Moreover, their supposedly intrinsic representational character would still need elucidating.¹¹

There is a further conflict lurking in the background. On the one hand, the concepts of meaning, intending, understanding, interpreting, and thinking have to be, as Wittgenstein later put it, *metalogical*. Otherwise they would merely signify phenomena. But they cannot signify mere phenomena, since what they signify must contain *a picture* of what is meant or intended, of what is understood or thought – and no mere phenomenon can do that. Phenomena are not intentional; they may have a 'natural meaning', but not a 'non-natural' one. However, if they do not signify psychological phenomena, they cannot belong to the subject matter of psychology. So the only sense in which psychology could find out, for example, what the constituents of thoughts are would be that it could investigate thoughts 'from the outside' – for example, as cortical phenomena (MS 145, 48f.). But that would be of no interest to philosophy.

3. *The 1930s and the Investigations*

The early and mid-1930s were spent on two great tasks. The first consisted of attempting to articulate a new philosophy on the themes of the nature of language and linguistic representation, of thought and intentionality, of meaning and understanding, of the nature of mathematics and of philosophy itself. The second consisted of dismantling the philosophy of the *Tractatus*, identifying its errors and their sources. The destructive work went remarkably smoothly. Once Wittgenstein had rejected the independence postulate for elementary propositions and allocated the role of sempiternal objects to samples that belong to the means of representation, the whole structure of the *Tractatus* collapsed. But it took much longer to arrive at the alternative he presented in the *Investigations*.

A glance at the table of contents for *The Big Typescript* suggests extensive engagement with themes in philosophy of psychology. The section headings herald discussions of understanding, meaning (*meinen*), interpreting, thought and thinking; expectation, wish and their fulfilment; current experience, pain, and idealism; and so forth. However, this is misleading, since his engagement with all these themes is geared primarily to issues pertaining to his early philosophy and its demolition, on the one hand, and to the effort to find new solutions to much the same problems, on the other. The only question we need address for present purposes is what the achievements of *The Big Typescript* and its revisions were in respect of psychological concepts, on the one hand, and the psychological presuppositions that had arguably characterized his early philosophy, on the other.

First, he came to realize that thinking, understanding and meaning are not metalogical concepts, but humdrum concepts like others. Wittgenstein used the term 'metalogical' to indicate a purported attribute of a fundamental concept (or of what is signified by such a concept) which was conceived to signify (or to be) what links the domain of logic, i.e.

¹¹ The resolution to this destructive dilemma is, of course, that thoughts are not representations at all. Any representation must have a medium of representation that has non-representational qualities (e.g. the colour of the ink, the timbre of the voice). But thoughts are, as Marshall McLuhan might have put it, all message and no medium. It is unfortunate that contemporary proponents of the LOT (language of thought) hypothesis are apparently unaware of this decisive objection to their misconceived hypothesis.

propositions, thoughts, representations of how things are, with reality. He had long been tempted to believe that 'understanding' is a metalogical word (MS 116, 16), the idea being that understanding is a metalogical process that gets one from the bare sign to its verifying fact (MS 110, 193). Similarly, one readily thinks of meaning something (*meinen*) as a metalogical act, and of *agreement with reality* as a metalogical concept that signifies the relation between picture and what is pictured. But this whole conception of a 'connection between language and reality' is misguided. 'Just as there is no metaphysics', he wrote on the opening page of *The Big Typescript* (BT 1), 'there is no metalogic; and the word "understanding", the expression "understanding a proposition", aren't metalogical. They are expressions of language like all others'. 'The proposition "I mean something . . ." is not metalogical.' (Vol. XIV, Um. 27). 'Depicting' is no metalogical concept (BT 285v), and neither is 'agreement with reality' (MS 113, 49v; MS 115, 85). What a sentence means is said by *an explanation*, i.e. by *another sentence* (MS 116, 3) – so the very idea that processes of meaning and understanding are metalogical, foundational (MS 110, 160), necessary to link language to reality, or to bridge the apparent gap between an order and its execution (MS 110, 191; MS 116, 22) is chimerical. In the end, he came to realize that the very idea that thinking is something unique and mysterious is itself an illusion (cf. PI §§95, 97, 110).

Second, the supposition that language has, as it were, an inorganic and an organic part – a system of signs, and underlying psychological processes that infuse signs with life by thinking them, meaning such-and-such by them, understanding them as representing such-and-such – has to be abandoned (BT 283-7; cf. BB 3). The meaning of an expression is its use, and it is its use that gives it life.

Third, he accordingly reiterates his anti-psychologism. Psychological *phenomena* are of no concern to his logico-linguistic investigations (BT 284). The temptation to explain symbolic processes by reference to psychological ones, must be resisted (BT 283). It can never be essential to his investigation that a phenomenon of symbolizing takes place in the mind and not on paper (BT 284). So too, the psychological *process* of understanding is of no interest to him (BT 330). Indeed, one must beware of constructing a mythology of psychological processes (MS 114, 35), as he had done in the presuppositions underlying the *Tractatus*. But the *concepts* of understanding, meaning, knowing, interpreting, thinking, need elucidation (and subsequent elucidation was to show that understanding is not a process at all).

Over the next decade, as his reflections on these concepts evolved, he shifted from the formal or realist anti-psychologism that he had taken over from Frege to a form of philosophical anthropology in which full justice was done to these psychological concepts and their roles in the web of concepts surrounding the notions of linguistic representation, without lapsing into psychologism.

Fourth, the puzzlement about the pictoriality (intentionality) of the proposition, about how it is possible to think something that is not the case, about the possibility of a proposition's being false but nevertheless meaningful, dissolves. The *Tractatus* had tried to solve the problem by means of the picture theory of the proposition and its attendant modal realism (realism about objective metaphysical possibilities). The harmony between language and reality was orchestrated metalogically. Now Wittgenstein realized that '*It is in language that it is all done*' (PG 143). The discussions of expectation and wish are focused upon their 'business part', i.e. upon their pictoriality (how they 'reach right up to reality' and seemingly 'foreshadow the facts'), not upon those aspects of expectation that might concern the philosophy of psychology. It was confused to suppose that the expectation that *p* contains a picture of what is expected, and to construe that in terms of metalogical relations of words or thought-constituents to world. Rather, it is a simple rule of grammar that the expectation that

p is the expectation that is fulfilled by its coming about that p (PG 161f.). The patent internal relation between the expectation that p and the event that p is merely a shadow of a grammatical substitution-rule. The picture theory was a metaphysical mountain postulated to solve a puzzle that is dissolved by the description of a grammatical molehill.

Fifth, just as the relationship between a proposition and the fact that makes it true is not a relationship between thought and world, but an intra-grammatical one, so too 'The assignment of a name to an object is nothing other than that produced by the words "That is ..." or by a table, etc. It is part of the symbolism. Therefore it's incorrect to say [as he once had] that the relationship between a name and an object is psychological' (BT 174).

It is clear that the metaphysics and modal realism of the *Tractatus* has been eliminated, the picture theory has collapsed and with it the whole idea of word-world semantic correlations. This has been replaced by an intra-grammatical resolution of the problems of the intentionality of the proposition. The thought that certain psychological acts and processes must be metalogical has been swept aside, but the insistence that psychology – the study of psychological *phenomena* – is irrelevant to logical investigations is retained. However, only a little progress has yet been made towards elucidation of the concepts of meaning something, thinking, understanding and interpreting.

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Wittgenstein laboured prodigiously. He clarified his ideas on metaphysics – a non-subject that rests on a confusion and conflation of empirical and conceptual questions. He elucidated the use of the first-person pronoun, and its misuse that informs both dualism and solipsism, and disentangled the knotted threads that lead to solipsism. These epistemological and metaphysical themes, though they touch questions in philosophy of psychology, are tangential and need not concern us. He also elucidated the concept of understanding – an ability, rather than a state or process; the concept of meaning something – neither a process nor an act of any kind; of interpreting – not an act or process that always accompanies understanding. He gave a detailed overview of the concepts of thinking and of imagining, where they bear on the overall theme of the *Investigations*. By and large, his engagement with specific psychological concepts is subordinate to more general concerns in philosophy. It is in the course of these clarifications that he laid the foundations for his subsequent engagement with philosophy of psychology. So before turning to the latter, I shall survey the former.

1. Wittgenstein clarified his position with regard to behaviourism. He agreed with logical behaviourists that behaviour is internally related to the mental, and with behaviourists in general that language learning is founded on brute training, that it presupposes natural behaviour and behavioural reaction, and that avowals of experience are themselves a form of behaviour. Unlike the behaviourists, however, he denied that the mental is a fiction (as Watson had insisted), or that the mental is reducible to behaviour (as logical behaviourists such as Carnap in the early 1930s and Hempel in the 1940s had suggested). Above all, he denied that behaviour is 'bare bodily movement' – a residual half of a false Cartesian duality. On the contrary, human behaviour is grasped as *animate* – as the behaviour of a living animal. It is perceived as *a manifestation or expression* of cognitive, cogitative, affective and volitional powers, and is so described.

2. He clarified his position with regard to dualism and its conception of inner and outer as externally related domains. The dualist (and 'mentalist' or idealist) conception of the inner as ethereal (or 'pneumatic' – animated by psychic pneuma), as being privately owned, as a domain to which the subject has privileged access by introspection, and as the object of indubitable first-person knowledge is misconceived. The corresponding conception of the outer as 'mere bodily behaviour' is equally misguided. And the conception of the relationship between the inner and outer as *external* and *causal* is likewise flawed. Consciousness is no

‘inner searchlight’; the ability to say how things are with one is not the result of a kind of ‘inner perception’; self-consciousness is not a matter of an ‘I think’ being able to accompany all my representations; and experiences are not *this-es* and *thus-es* (qualia, as current jargon would have it) revealed to consciousness by introspection.

3. Stimulated by his reading of Köhler, Wittgenstein disagreed with the received conception of the distinction between psychology and the natural sciences. Psychology does not treat of processes in the mental sphere as the physicist does in the physical sphere (PI §571). That idea is rooted in dualist conceptions of mind and body and attendant misunderstandings of the relationships between the mental and its behavioural manifestations. But mental ‘objects’ (such as sensations), events and processes, are not just like physical objects, events and processes, only immaterial. The psychologist observes the behaviour of human beings (which is not ‘bare bodily movement’) and draws conclusions about their minds, but not on the model of the physicist drawing inferences from the observed to the unobserved – as if the mental were hidden ‘behind’ the observable behaviour and as if the procedure were a kind of analogical or inductive inference, or an inference to the best explanation. The behaviour the psychologist observes is an *expression* of the mental. The pain, joy, depression, thought, intention, etc. are not hidden *behind* the painful movement, joyful smile, depressed mien and tone, expression of thought, intentional action, etc. The psychologist does not observe them ‘indirectly’, and the subject does not observe them ‘directly’ – since he does not observe them at all.

4. Wittgenstein paid more attention than any other philosopher to the asymmetry between first- and third-person present tense psychological propositions.¹² The asymmetry consists in the fact that predicating psychological attributes of others is warranted by what they do and say. By contrast, one’s use of such sentences in the first-person present tense does not rest on one’s observation of one’s own behaviour. According to tradition, the asymmetry is a reflection of *epistemic* differences, explicable by reference to the essential (metaphysical) privacy of experience. Wittgenstein denied this. The asymmetry is an aspect of *grammatical* differences between first- and third-person utterances reflecting their different roles in our language-games. The first-person utterance is not, in the primal case, a *description* of anything (in particular, not of anything observed *in foro interno*) but rather an *expression*. But that does not preclude reports and descriptions of the inner (which remain unlike reports and descriptions of the outer). To be sure, not all expressions of the inner are extensions of primitive behaviour, but even when they are not (e.g. expressions of belief or intention), grammatical asymmetries persist.

5. For an important subclass of psychological verbs, it makes no (epistemic) sense to ascribe to oneself knowledge, belief, doubt or certainty in the present tense. ‘I know that I am in pain’ may indeed have various uses, but no *epistemic* use.¹³ Doubt and ignorance are excluded by grammar, and by the same token so are certainty and knowledge. Avowals of thought and experience do not rest on introspection (indeed, the very idea that they do depends on a misconception of introspection). They rest on nothing at all.

6. In third-person cases, psychological attributes are predicated of agents on the basis of what they do and say (including their avowals of thought and experience) but this is not

¹² For detailed discussion and defence of this point, see P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Of knowledge and of knowing that one is in pain’, in A. Pichler and S. Säätelä eds. *Wittgenstein: the Philosopher and his Works* (Bergen, The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 2005), pp. 203–35.

¹³ There is nothing contradictory about this. When one *forgets* one’s troubles in the company of a cheerful friend, this is not a cognitive, mnemonic defect, but a matter of distraction of attention. So it is a non-epistemic use of ‘to forget’. So too ‘I know I am in pain’ may be an emphatic or concessive, non-epistemic use of ‘I know’, altogether unlike ‘I know he is in pain’.

inductive evidence for the inner, it is *logically* good evidence or 'criteria'. The inner stands in need of outer criteria. Such evidence is circumstance-dependent and defeasible. But if not defeated it typically suffices for certainty.

7. The subject of psychological attributes is not the ego, the mind or the body a sentient being may have, but the animal as a whole.¹⁴

8. The conception of experience as *privately owned*, such that different people cannot have the same experiences, but only similar ones, i.e. ones that are numerically distinct but qualitatively identical (different tokens of the same type, as some contemporary philosophers misguidedly put it) is mistaken. Insofar as it makes sense for two people to have the same experience, then, to be sure, it is perfectly common for different people to have the same experience.¹⁵

9. Concepts of experience are not acquired by means of association or by a private analogue of ostensive definition. There *is no such thing as* private ostensive definition, that is: the phrase 'a private ostensive definition' is excluded from the language, just as is the phrase 'checkmate in draughts' (Z §134). Similarly, there is no such thing as a memory of an experience fulfilling the function of a defining sample.

10. The limits of thought are the limits of the behavioural expression of thought. It is perfectly possible, in certain circumstances, for an animal to think and not show it. But it makes sense to ascribe thinking to an animal only insofar as the animal's behavioural repertoire includes such behaviour as *would* express what the animal is said to think. Consequently, the capacity to think in anything other than the most primitive manner is parasitic on the ability to speak. For all but the most primitive thinking can be expressed only in forms of linguistic or symbolic behaviour. Speech is not a translation from language-independent thoughts into words, and thinking is not normally an *accompaniment* of thoughtful speech.

These controversial, indeed revolutionary, conceptual commitments are prominent in the *Investigations*. They are all grammatical clarifications supported by reasoned argument. Their denial leads to incoherence. And they provide a very substantial grammatical framework for more detailed investigations of the large network of psychological concepts that inform the lives of language-using creatures like us. It was to such investigations that Wittgenstein turned in 1946.

4. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology: finding his way*

Wittgenstein's investigations into the nature of language, linguistic meaning and representation led him, after 1944, deeper and deeper into philosophical questions concerning psychological concepts and psychological phenomena. He moved on three related fronts: the classification of psychological phenomena and the categories under which they are to be subsumed; the connective analysis of psychological concepts and the description of the language-games in which they are at home; and the connections between psychological

¹⁴ With the exception of verbs of sensation, such as 'to hurt', 'to itch', 'to tickle', which can be ascribed to the body and its parts.

¹⁵ Why 'insofar as it makes sense'? It makes sense to say that you have the same headache as I if one has reason to believe that your headache, like mine, is dull, throbbing and in the left temples. But it makes no sense to suppose that we *share* the same pain, as we might share the same house. And for us to have the same pain does not mean that you have my pain, as you might have my keys. *I* can't significantly be said have *my* pain either (since 'my pain' = 'the pain I have', and 'I have the pain I have' says nothing). 'N's pain' neither specifies a pain nor a relation of possession. So 'I have your pain' makes sense only if it has been specified *what* pain you have, and even then it is merely a clumsy way of saying that I have the same pain as you.

concepts and certain very general facts of nature concerning ourselves and the world in which we live, which in an important sense condition our concepts. The latter strand in his reflections explains the (non-Humean) sense in which he can be said to have *naturalized* philosophy in general and philosophy of psychology in particular – but not by assimilating it to an ‘armchair science’ or by cleaving to a form of scientism.

These explorations, especially those into wanting, intending and meaning something, proved to be fruitful – finding new pathways through old jungles. It was altogether natural that, with the completion of the final draft of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein should turn to concentrated work on the philosophy of psychology. It is clear that he found the themes that he was working on of interest in their own right. When he was struggling with the similarities and differences between seeing something and imagining it, he remarked ‘The problem with which I am basically concerned here is really much more wonderful than will perhaps appear to someone who reads these lines. For it is a very general conceptual problem. (Comparable, I believe, to a *great* problem in mathematics.)’ (MS 136, 7a). He himself raised the question of the point of his investigations into philosophy of psychology:

Is it right to say that *my* investigations are characterized by a certain kind of purposelessness? – I don’t mean that they are useless, but that they are not explicitly conducted with a view to a purpose. Is it then a case of ‘l’art pour l’art’? I would *not* want to say that. That sounds too arty [*spielerisch*], and as if one wanted to say ‘I do it because it is beautiful’ or something like that. – But I could surely say: must everything we do be done with a clear purpose? And if not – is it therefore without any connection with the rest of life? Does it therefore have no consequences; or bad ones? (MS 134, 154)

A couple of pages later, he responds further to his worries. The point of his classifications and comparisons of psychological phenomena is that they can answer a whole array of philosophical problems. It is a *method* (although, to be sure, not a mechanical one) of getting clear about conceptual difficulties (MS 134, 156). In some cases, e.g. Moore’s paradox of belief or the paradox of puzzle pictures, Wittgenstein did tackle a philosophical conundrum directly. And here his investigations bring us to realize conceptual affinities and differences of which we were previously unaware. But for the most part, his concern was with plotting the conceptual terrain – what Ryle was later to call ‘logical geography’.¹⁶ For, as Wittgenstein put it, ‘The philosopher wants to master the geography of concepts; to see every locality in its proximate and also in its most distant surroundings’ (137, 63a). Indeed,

In order to know your way about an environment, you don’t merely need to be acquainted with the right path from one district to another; you need also to know where you’d get to if you took the wrong turning. This shows how similar our considerations are to travelling in a landscape with a view to constructing a map. And it is not impossible that such a map will sometime get constructed for the regions we are moving in. (MS 131, 121 = RPP I, §303)

He himself is not so much engaged with constructing a detailed map as with preparing a preliminary survey, as it were, something that will enable people to orient themselves. He

¹⁶ It is impossible to know whether Ryle got the analogy from Wittgenstein or hit upon it independently. What is clear, however, is that Wittgenstein was already using the geographical analogy in 1933/4 (see AWL 43; cp. LFM 44).

aimed not at exactness, but at surveyability (MS 134, 83), not at completeness, but at putting his reader in a position to shift for himself when he encounters conceptual difficulties (LW I, §686).¹⁷

He was, he wrote apropos his lectures, showing his pupils a segment of a vast landscape in which it is impossible that they should know their way around (MS 133, 44r) by themselves.

The difficulty is to know one's way about among concepts of "psychological phenomena". To move about among them without repeatedly running up against an obstacle. That it to say: one has got to *master* the kinships and differences of concepts. As someone is master of the transition from any key to any other one, modulates from one to the other. (MS 135, 73 = RPP I, §1054)

Of course, everyone has mastered the *use* of these commonplace psychological concepts – we are as familiar as can be with the language-games in which they are at home. But we lack an overview of the field of psychological concepts. This is emphatically *not* a matter of having an ability, but lacking a theoretic representation of that ability, or of knowing the meanings of psychological expressions but lacking a theory of their meaning.¹⁸ The last thing we want, Wittgenstein averred, is a philosophical *theory* (MS 130, 218) that misguidedly tries to ape theories in the sciences. The aim is to produce surveyable representations or presentations ('Darstellungen') of segments of the domain of psychological language. The method is *descriptive*. But we are not accustomed to *comparing* the various concepts, whose use we have mastered, with each other. We are not used to *juxtaposing* different concepts in order to note similarities and differences. And that is just what we have to do in order to attain an overview of our psychological language. But when we try to describe these conceptual similarities and differences, sentences whose use we cannot survey constantly intrude themselves (MS 130, 220), leading to bafflement, distortion and misrepresentation of the conceptual terrain.

In 1948, after he had been working on themes in the philosophy of psychology for almost two years, experimenting with different ways of classifying and ordering psychological concepts and phenomena, Wittgenstein remarked 'I am the inventor of certain discussion-clarifying devices; like someone who invented novel, more surveyable, ways of book-keeping' (MS 135, 146).¹⁹ For part of his struggle throughout this period was to find a fruitful and illuminating method of *classifying*, or of *ordering*, the problematic concepts with which he was concerned. The result of a philosophical investigation, he remarked early in the course of his enquiries, is sometimes *a new filing system* (MS 130, 82). What did he have in mind? At one stage he suggested that maybe what is needed is 'a new nomenclature' for psychological categories.²⁰ What he meant is not so much a new terminology as a new *classification*. It is not that new *words* are needed – as if the trouble with psychology were an impoverished language. Nothing could be more wrong than supposing, as James often did,

¹⁷ He repeatedly castigates himself in 1948 for going into more detail than is necessary (MS 134, 98; 135, 186), remarking that 'It seems to me that I am still a long way from understanding these things, namely from the point where I know what I needn't talk about. I still get myself entangled in details, without knowing even whether I should talk about these things' (MS 136, 37a).

¹⁸ An idea that was the drive-shaft of M. A. E. Dummett's researches into theories of meaning for a natural language.

¹⁹ A metaphor strikingly related to his much earlier remark 'Grammar is the account books of language' (PG 87).

²⁰ He notes parenthetically that this is a step that is only rarely to be recommended in philosophy.

that mistakes and confusions in psychology could be remedied by introducing new *names* (MS 134, 108).²¹ What is needed is 'a profound change in our thought; for example, in what we are looking for and in what we stop looking for. Such changes, to be sure, often get expressed in a changed terminology' (ibid.). What did Wittgenstein have in mind here? I suspect that the *kind* of thing that he meant is that, for example, once we have cleared the ground of the houses of cards built out of misapprehensions of the concept of consciousness, the search for so called neural correlates of consciousness will be abandoned, at least in its present form²², and be replaced by better questions which neuroscience *can* handle. Once we clarify what it is to possess a concept, we shall cease to search for a concept module in the brain where concepts are stored and correlated with words.²³ Once we have disentangled confusions about the concept of vision, we shall cease looking for the part of the brain that 'puts together the information' from the sense organs to form a 'picture' of 'the external world' around us²⁴, and investigate the vehicle of our visual powers without the incumbrance of unintelligible questions.

So, what is needed, it seemed, was a new array of psychological categories in terms of which to *order* psychological concepts. What did he conceive to be the existing categories, and what was wrong with them? Arguably they were such general categories as *mental state*, *mental process*, *mental event*, *mental act*, and *experience*. Philosophers, psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists are prone to rely on these very general terms in specifying their subject matter. So, we are often told at the beginning of an epistemological investigation, that knowing is a mental state, just as being in pain is.²⁵ Similarly, it is a widespread view that

²¹ This Jamesian misunderstanding continues. Colin Blakemore, for example, has recently suggested that some of the conceptual difficulties in cognitive neuroscience are due not to conceptual confusion but to 'inadequacy of vocabulary [of everyday language] and notation' ('Understanding images in the brain', in H. Barlow, C. Blakemore, and M. Weston-Smith (eds) *Images and Understanding* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 283.

²² Christhof Koch (like his late colleague, Francis Crick) aims to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. He suggests that 'Whenever information is represented in the NCC you are conscious of it. The goal is to discover *the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific conscious percept.*' *The Quest for Consciousness* (Englewood, Colorado, Roberts and Company Publishers, 2004), p. 16.

²³ See, for example, W. J. M. Levelt, 'Accessing words in speech production', *Cognition* 42 (1992), pp. 1-22. For critical discussion of the idea that there could be a 'concept module' in the brain that stores concepts, see M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, 'Language and Cortical Function: Conceptual developments', *Progress in Neurobiology* 80 (2006), pp. 20-52.

²⁴ For example, contemporary neuroscientists' formulation of what they call 'the binding problem': 'How is information carried by separate pathways brought together into a coherent visual image? ... How does the brain construct a perceived world from sensory information and how does it bring it into consciousness? ... what the visual system really does [is] to create a three-dimensional perception of the world which is different from the two dimensional image projected onto the retina.' (E. R. Kandel and R. Wurtz, 'Constructing the visual image', in E. R. Kandel, J. H. Schwartz and T. M. Jessell (eds) *Principles of Neuroscience and Behaviour* (Stamford, CT, Apple and Lange, 1995), p. 492.) For critical discussion of the binding problem, see M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker, *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* (Oxford, Blackwell, 2003), pp. 137 - 143.

²⁵ See, for example, T. Williamson, *Knowledge and its Limits* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 21, who claims that knowing *p* is a 'state of mind', that a state of mind is a mental state, and that the mental state that constitutes knowing *p* is an attitude towards a proposition. But a mental state is not the same as a state of mind. Knowing, lacking 'genuine duration' is not a mental state, let alone a state of mind. And, unlike 'ridicule', 'contradict', 'endorse' or 'approve', which *can* signify attitudes towards something propositional, such as rumours, stories, claims, declarations, statements

believing is a mental state.²⁶ Philosophers and linguists alike conceive of understanding the speech of another as a process – of interpretation, or of deriving the truth-conditions of the heard sentence (which are conceived to constitute the meaning of the utterance) from the meanings of the individual words and their mode of combination.²⁷

Wittgenstein held that these terms, far from signifying sharp and clear cut categories, are exceedingly imprecise:

The concept of experience: like that of event, of process, of state, of something, of fact, of description and of statement. Here we think that we are standing on the hard bedrock, deeper than any special methods and language-games. But these extremely general terms have an extremely blurred meaning. They relate in practice to innumerable special cases, but that does not make them any *solider*; no, rather it makes them more fluid. (RPP I §648)

In our superficial classifications, we go wrong before our enquiries have even properly commenced. He had already remarked on this in the *Investigations*:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? — The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them – we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive move in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) (PI §308)

It seems utterly innocuous to classify knowledge or belief as mental states (after all, they are neither mental events, nor mental processes). What exactly these mental states are, we think, remains to be seen. And we proceed to speculate that they must surely be identical with brain states. But not only is it mistaken to take them to be mental states (*inter alia* because they lack ‘genuine duration’), it is further evident that we have no conception whatsoever what

and indeed propositions, ‘know’ takes ‘that-clauses’, which such verbs do not (one cannot endorse that *p*). To know that *p*, unlike endorsing *the proposition* that *p*, is not to have any attitude to anything. (See B. Rundle, *Mind in Action* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 62.)

²⁶ D. Davidson held that beliefs are correctly called “states of mind” (“The Myth of the Subjective”, repr. in his *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 40), and that “having a belief is ... being in a state” (“Indeterminism and Antirealism”, repr. op. cit., p. 74). J. R. Searle holds that beliefs are “intentional mental states” (*Intentionality* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-4), and T. Williamson (*Knowledge and its Limits*, p. 21) writes of believing that *p* as “the paradigmatic mental state”. For ten reasons why it is mistaken to classify belief as a mental state, see P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Of the Ontology of Belief’, in Mark Siebel and Mark Textor ed. *Semantik und Ontologie* (Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004), pp. 185-222. For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s equivocal views, see P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), Exg. §§572-5.

²⁷ See, for example, M. A. E. Dummett, who claims that it is ‘an undoubted fact that a process of derivation of some kind is involved in the understanding of a sentence’ (‘What is a theory of meaning?’, in S. Guttenplan ed. *Mind and Language* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 112; see also his ‘What is a theory of meaning II?’ in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 69f.; cf. N. Chomsky, *Reflections on Language* (London, Fontana, 1976), pp. 32f.) and J. Fodor and J. J. Katz, ‘What’s wrong with the philosophy of language?’, in C. Lyas ed., *Philosophy and Linguistics* (London, Macmillan and St Marin’s Press, 1971), p. 282.

might count as a brain state and what the criteria of identity for such brain states are. 'Thinking', we innocently proclaim, 'is a mysterious process, and we are a long way from fully understanding it' – and so we start *experimenting* – apparently without being aware *what* mystifies us (MS 135, 113), and without pausing to examine whether thinking is a *process* at all, and what differences there are even between those kinds of thinking that *do* approximate processes and incontrovertible processes.

We unthinkingly assume that mental states and processes are just like physical states and processes, only mental, that mental states are a species of state, another species of which is physical states. But that is precisely what we have no title to do. (Chess moves, Wittgenstein remarked, are not kinds of movements.) We think that mental processes are comparable to physical processes like digestion or breathing. But, Wittgenstein stresses, these are *incomparable*. If one wanted to find bodily conditions that *are* comparable to mental processes and states, they would be such things as the *quickness* of breath, the *irregularity* of the heartbeat, the *soundness* of digestion, and suchlike – all of which characterize corporeal behaviour (cf. RPP I §661).

Wittgenstein struggled to find a fruitful system of classification – initially, a *genealogy* of psychological concepts (MS 133, 73r = RPP I §722), or phenomena (MS 134, 83), and of experiences (MS 134, 124). (Whether he thought of these as the same investigation, or as different ones is unclear.) What did he mean by 'a genealogy'? This too is unclear, although some light is shed on the matter by the fact that he raises the question of whether what he is hunting for is something akin to the genealogy of different number concepts (such as natural numbers, signed integers, rationals, reals, etc.) – i.e. a kind of *logical* (non-historical) genealogy. Perhaps he meant such things as the reciprocal dependency of cognition and volition; the priority (contrary to the Cartesian and empiricist tradition) of observation statements (e.g. 'The chair is red') over perceptual statements, and of perceptual statements (e.g. 'I see ...') over sense-datum statements (e.g. 'It visually seems to me just as if ...'); the dependence of the intelligibility of doubt upon the possibility of certainty; the presupposition of the possession of a tensed language for the possibility of regret or remorse; and so on. But I find it impossible to be sure, since it is far from evident whether Wittgenstein actually thought of himself as having even begun to carry out the project.

What does seem clear is that the idea of a systematic genealogy foundered. Wittgenstein then attempted to construct *a systematic scheme of hierarchical classification* based on the thought that the field of the psychological can be deemed to be that of *experiences*, subclasses of which are undergoings (subsuming both images and impressions), emotions (directed and undirected) and forms of conviction (e.g. belief, certainty and doubt) (MS 134, 42f. = RPP I §836-7; on 18. 3. 1947). For various reasons, this too proved fruitless.²⁸ Nevertheless, Wittgenstein persisted with two guidelines. First, that his task was to impose *an order* upon psychological concepts. Secondly, that this itself would involve *new* categorial concepts. He noted that Weierstrass had introduced a whole series of new concepts to impose an order upon thought about the differential calculus. 'In just that way it seems to me, I shall have to impose an order upon psychological thought by means of *new* concepts' (MS 135, 115; 30 July, 1947). Strikingly, he invoked Goethe's idea of ordering botanical classification by reference to the organizing principle that the organs of the plant should be seen as transformations of a leaf. The affinity between his task in philosophy and Goethe's botanical project had occurred to Wittgenstein in the early 1930s, in connection with the idea

²⁸ See J. Schulte, *Experience and Expression* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), chapter 3 for a very helpful discussion of the matter.

of a surveyable representation ('Darstellung') of a domain of grammar.²⁹ Now he wrote:

What does a conceptual investigation do? Is it the natural history of human concepts? — Well, natural history describes, say, plants and animals. But could it not be that plants have been described in all their detail, and then someone turns up and notices analogies in their structure that nobody had noticed before? So he imposes an order on these descriptions. He says, e.g. 'Don't compare this part with that; rather, with this other one!' (Goethe wanted to do some such thing.) And in so doing, he is not necessarily speaking of descent [i.e. actual genealogy], but nevertheless the new way of arrangement might also give scientific investigation a new direction. He says 'Look at it in *this* way!' – and this may have advantages and consequences of different kinds. (134, 153 = RPP I §950)

On 14 December 1947, he noted that where he had previously spoken of a genealogical tree, he could just as well have spoken of an *order* in which one should discuss psychological concepts and explain their connections. But, he remarked, he was not clear about this order, especially about its beginning (MS 135, 184f.).

By 1948, however, Wittgenstein had apparently abandoned the idea of finding a specific sequential order in which one should discuss psychological concepts. (To suppose that there is would perhaps be akin to supposing that there is a specific sequential order in which one should describe a landscape.) There are *various* ways in which these concepts can be ordered for philosophical discussion, and which is most appropriate depends on one's purposes and interests. He had also abandoned the idea, never really executed, of introducing new classificatory concepts. He had introduced the novel concept of *genuine duration* – a very fruitful and illuminating one – but it was the only new concept for which he had found a need.³⁰ However, he did not abandon the idea of *imposing an order* upon our psychological concepts for purposes of surveyability.

We must always remember that we aren't trying to explain one psychological phenomenon in terms of another; rather, [taking them] as we find them, we should arrange them in an order. So we don't want to say that *this* is really *that*, but only, insofar as we can, to point to similarities and dissimilarities. (MS 137, 9b; 6 February 1948)

This conception accords with something that he had written right at the beginning of his investigations into the philosophy of psychology:

Don't forget that we don't have to *explain* a phenomenon, but only to describe! What we are not looking for is a 'philosophical theory'.

²⁹ For detailed discussion see J. Schulte, 'Chor und Gesetz: zur "morphologischen Methode" bei Goethe und Wittgenstein', repr. in *Chor und Gesetz* (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1990), and G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, 'Surveyability and surveyable representations', in *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, vol. 1 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, 2nd ed., extensively revised by P. M. S. Hacker (Oxford, Blackwell, 2005), part 1 – *The Essays*.

³⁰ The only other novel concept mentioned is that of a 'germ' (MS 133, 87v), presumably like the experience of being about to do something – but, Wittgenstein immediately notes, this could be misleading (as James was misled into talking of experiencing a tendency), and he makes no use of the idea.

A completely unordered description is of no value for us. But to see a relevant order is difficult, because it is concealed by the net of grammar. (MS 130, 218f.; 28 July 1946)

The purpose is a survey of the terrain of psychological concepts that will enable one to find one's way around. Indeed, he noted in January, 1948, the importance of his treatment of the phenomena of mental life is not because he is keen on completeness, but because *each one casts light on the treatment of all* (MS 136, 129 = RPP II §311 (Z §465)). Each of his peregrinations displays the investigative methods and techniques of elucidation appropriate for plotting the terrain anywhere else in the landscape.

At the end of 1947 (MS 136, 3a - 4a = RPP II §63; 18 December 1947), Wittgenstein drew up a plan for the treatment of psychological concepts without any genealogy, and without any hierarchical classification. He emphasized the first/third person asymmetry characteristic of many psychological verbs and the associated distinction between expression and description. He distinguished sensations from kinaesthetic awareness, on the one hand, and from sense perception, on the other.³¹ He began to sketch out differences between sense

³¹ Sensations, e.g. pain, have genuine duration, degrees (from scarcely noticeable to unendurable) and qualitative mixtures. They have a *bodily location* (unlike seeing and hearing, but like feeling pressure, warmth or even taste). One knows, i.e. one can say, *where* a pain is. There is a distinctive reaction to touching *the place* of a pain. But the sensation of pain does not have a place-indicative component (just as there is no temporal sign to a memory image). Pain is differentiated from other sense experiences by its characteristic expression, which makes it akin to joy, which is not a sense experience at all (RPP II §63)).

It has recently been suggested (J. Hyman, 'Pains and Places', *Philosophy* 78 (2003), pp. 5 - 24) that Wittgenstein 'explicitly denies that bodily pain is located in the body' (ibid. p. 13). The relevant passage in Wittgenstein is as follows:

What is it that interests me about someone else's regret? His attitude towards his action. The signs of regret are the signs of aversion, of sadness. The expression of regret [*reue* – also *remorse*] refers to the action.

Regret is called a mental pain, because the signs of pain are similar to those of regret.

But if one wanted to find an analogy to the place of pain, it would of course not be the mind (just as the place of bodily pain is not the body) but the *object* of regret. (MS 136, 127 = RPP II §307)

Dr Hyman takes this as evidence that Wittgenstein thought that the bodily location of pain, i.e. the place at which the sufferer points when asked where it hurts, is an *intentional location*, 'like a place which is an object of thought' (ibid. p. 14). And he conjectures that Wittgenstein thought that 'bodily pain, like grief, is a state or condition of the whole person or animal, and hence that the only non-intentional location that can be assigned to it is the location of the person or animal' (ibid., p. 15). This is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's account, and a misinterpretation of the above passage. The bearer of pain is the suffering person. The location of pain is the part of the body that hurts. The criterion for the location of pain is the person's behaviour—his pointing to and assuaging the part that hurts, his saying 'I have a headache [toothache, stomach ache]'. The place where he suffers from his headache is wherever he is when he has a headache.

Wittgenstein's point in the above passage was as follows: to say that a pain is *bodily* no more gives its location than to say that a pain is *physical* does. Bodily (physical) pain stands in contrast with mental (psychological) pain. None of these adjectives is location-specifying, rather all are category-specifying. To say that a pain is bodily or physical is, among other things, to say that it makes sense to *ask* where it is – but it is not to *answer* that question. To say that regret is a form of mental pain is not to locate the regret, any more than to complain of bodily or physical pain is to locate the pain. So, in the case of regret or remorse, is there anything *analogous* to location for pain?

perceptions and visual and auditory mental images – a task he subsequently took up and treated in refined detail. Six days later, he limned the contours of the concept of emotion and of the related concepts of mood and attitude (MS 136, 27b = RPP II §148). For much of the remainder of his notes on the philosophy of psychology, he pursued the objective of comparing and contrasting psychological concepts. He often could not resist darting down side-streets from time to time to examine a little known but fascinating locality off the High Street (LFM 44), so we find long digressions and subsidiary investigations. Nevertheless, the objective and the methods had become reasonably clear. He was no longer hoping to introduce a new nomenclature, or new categories. He did not aim at a systematic genealogy of psychological concepts or phenomena, or at an order of introduction. So what exactly was he doing?

5. *The project*

Wittgenstein came to see his goal as that of ordering psychological concepts in surveyable representations. Far from eschewing existing categories, he was perfectly willing to make use of them, with five provisos.

First, that it be clear that these categorial concepts are vague and elastic, hence not *very* useful in mapping the contours of psychological concepts. ‘They relate in practice to innumerable special cases’ (RPP I §648). With regard to expecting, Wittgenstein noted ‘If one asks: is this a mental state – one sees that neither the answer “Yes” nor the answer “No” helps. There are too many (psychological) categories all of which could be called “mental states”. The classification no longer helps here. One must distinguish the concepts from one another individually’ (MS 167, 6). This is of capital importance – it rules out mechanical pigeon-holing.

Secondly, we must constantly bear in mind that these vague categorials, applied to the domain of the mental, are not species of a genus, of which the co-ordinate species are physical. The striking differences between, for example, a mental state (e.g. feeling excited) and a physical state (e.g. being in a filthy state), or between a mental act (e.g. deciding) and a physical act (e.g. shutting the door) need to be clarified and emphasized. Above all, we must beware of classifying something as a mental state (for example, knowledge or belief), or as a mental activity (for example, thinking), and cautiously leaving its nature undecided – thinking

Wittgenstein suggests that it is the *object of regret* (or *remorse*). Why? Because specifying what one regrets serves to identify one’s regret, just as specifying the location of a pain (a headache, not a backache; a stomach-ache, not a toothache) serves to identify the pain one has. Further, a cry of pain is linked to clutching the part that hurts – that is natural *expressive* pain-behaviour, and the stock upon which learning to specify the locus of pain is grafted. And acculturated pain-behaviour consists of utterances such as ‘I have a headache (toothache, stomach-ache)’, i.e. location-specifying pain-utterances. There is no ‘natural’ *pre-linguistic* regret- or remorse-behaviour, for only someone who can reflect upon the past can feel regret or remorse – these are concepts that are applicable only to a being that possesses a language (Z §§518-20; cf. §§495-517). But the normal (acculturated) *expression* (*Äusserung*) of regret or remorse is ‘I wish I hadn’t *done that*’ (specifying the object of regret or remorse) or ‘If only I hadn’t *done such-and-such*’ – and that, in the appropriate circumstances, is akin to a cry of pain emitted while clutching the part that hurts. Finally, if someone torments himself with regret or remorse, the analogy to assuaging some part of his body is persuading him that the *object* of his regret or remorse is not so bad, unfortunate or morally wrong as it seems to him to be. It is these three features that make the object of regret or remorse *analogous* to the place of pain. There is here no suggestion that Wittgenstein thought that bodily pain has an ‘intentional location’, although, of course, the grammar of ‘I have pain in my leg’ is very different from that of ‘I have a pin in my leg’.

that sooner or later science will reveal the nature of this peculiar mental state or that strange mental process. But this apparent caution is in fact a form of negligence – and the decisive move in the conjuring trick has been executed without our even noticing it (PI §308).

Thirdly, there should be no presumption that a problematic concept (or phenomenon) is subsumable under *any* useful or illuminating existing category (belief, for example, is not). This should not be surprising – these very general terms were not introduced into our language to serve the special classificatory purposes of a Linnaeus, but to serve the ordinary non-classificatory purposes of ordinary speakers (indeed, the use of ‘mental state’, as well as its differences from ‘state of mind’, are worthy of careful investigation).

Fourthly, there should be no presumption that a given psychological concept or phenomenon that *is* subsumable under one or other of these general categories is subsumable under *only* one. The psychological verbs have manifold uses. ‘Being gloomy’, for example, may signify an occurrent mental state with genuine duration, an enduring dispositional state or a character trait. ‘Expecting’ may signify an occurrent mental state, a belief or supposition (‘I expect he’ll be there’), or a demand (‘I expect you to be there!’).

Fifthly, categorial classification may sometimes be positively useless for the purposes of a comparative overview. ‘Knowing, believing, hoping, fearing, etc. are such different kinds of concepts’, Wittgenstein wrote, ‘that a classification, arranging them in different drawers, is of no use for us. But we want to recognize the differences and similarities between them’ (MS 137, 89b). Being told, for example, that knowledge is an ability, whereas belief is not will not shed much light upon the complex relationships between the two concepts, upon the language-games in which they are at home, and upon their point.

With these provisos, Wittgenstein was now willing to go along with existing classifications. ‘I don’t want to produce some sort of final classification of psychological concepts,’ he wrote, ‘but rather to show to what extent the existing one can be justified, and also to show that uncertainty clings to any such classification. The classification should be used only to emphasize rough differences between concepts’ (MS 137, 89b).³² Consequently, his categorial observations are more often than not *negative*: meaning something is *not* a mental act or activity; understanding is *not* a mental state or process, but more akin to an ability; thinking is *not* generally an activity, and even when it approximates one, it is logically altogether unlike a physical activity (and that does not merely mean: it is mental, not physical).

At the end of 1947 (at the same time as he drew up his plan for the treatment of psychological concepts), Wittgenstein wrote that he felt that he should write ‘about “psychological phenomena” in general. As it were, about the different ways the different psychological categories come into being’ (MS 134, 98). It is clear from the sequel that he did not mean the very general categories of (mental) states, processes, acts and activities, etc., but

³² A conclusion strikingly similar to Ryle’s some years later. Having placed far too much emphasis on the notion of a category-mistake in *Concept of Mind* (1949), in *Dilemmas* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1953) p. 9) Ryle came to the conclusion that

This idiom [of categories] can be helpful as a familiar mnemonic with some beneficial associations. It can also be an impediment, if credited with the virtues of a skeleton-key. I think it is worthwhile to take some pains with this word ‘category’, but not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact professional way of using it, in which, like a skeleton-key, it will turn all our locks for us; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal-hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us. It gives answers to none of our questions but it can be made to arouse people to the answers in a properly brusque way.

the more specific categories such as perceptions, sense-impressions, emotions, and so forth. What had caught his attention was, for example, the question of how one arrived at the thought that seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, etc. belong together (MS 136, 131b). The suggestion that they all inform us about 'the external world' he brushes away, rather surprisingly, as superficial. We should imagine a language, he suggests, without the general term 'perception', but with words such as 'see', 'hear', 'smell', 'taste', etc. And now examine the affinities and differences between the senses – the complex web of connections – and these concepts immediately drift much farther apart than one might expect. The connections that warrant classifying them together are far more complex and subtle than might initially seem.

The description of affinities (both similarities and connections) and of differences is a hallmark of Wittgenstein's method in philosophy of psychology. The surface grammar of psychological verbs and nouns is especially misleading (MS 134, 126). The concepts are disguised (MS 134, 125). Countless psychological verbs that look so alike in their surface grammar 'have a barely comparable mode of application. Once that is realized, the investigation of the particular case becomes much easier' (MS 129, 178). How is one to combat the illusions of homogeneity generated by surface grammar? In three ways:

First, 'direct your interest to the language-games' (MS 130, 151) in which the concept is at home – the *behaviour* with which the word meshes, and the *occasion* on which it is appropriate (MS 134, 126). If one is baffled by the misleading similarities between seeing something and imagining something, then one should attend to the different situations in which these verbs are used, the different forms of behaviour that are appropriate to 'I see (and 'He sees') X' and 'I imagine (and 'He imagines') X' as well as to 'Look at X!', as opposed to 'Imagine X!'.

Secondly, investigate the ways in which the concept might be taught, for there is a systematic connection between possible ways of teaching and meaning. If one is baffled how dreaming that something is so and perceiving that something is so differ, start by examining how one might teach a child to prefix 'I dreamt' to a description. If one is puzzled how a person can 'know what he intends', investigate how one might teach a child the use of 'I'm going to ...'. The primitive language-games here involved are not the ground-floor of a theory, but poles of a description (RPP I §633).

Thirdly, one must overcome the misleading features of surface grammar by description of the kinships and differences of concepts (MS 135, 73). Importantly, one should not look merely for similarities in order to justify a concept (i.e. a classification), 'but also connections. A father gives his name to his son, even though his son is altogether unlike him' (MS 134, 125 = RPP I §923). Seeing and imagining are *connected*, but contrary to Hume, not by *similarity*, and their distinctness is not a matter of relative vivacity. Seeing and tasting are both forms of sense perception, but not because they are alike.

How are kinships and differences of concepts to be discerned? Apart from language-game contextualization, surely by careful examination of usage. We need to examine the dozens of familiar paths leading off in different directions from a given concept. It is possible to say something quickly or slowly, but not to mean something quickly or slowly. One can be interrupted in one's state of concentration, but it makes no sense to say that one was interrupted in knowing or believing. 'He believes that *p*, but it is false that *p*' makes sense, but 'I believe that *p*, but it is false that *p*' does not. And so on. Each such grammatical observation is part of the profile of the constituent concepts, and an appropriate ordering of such observations depicts a distinctive feature in the landscape of psychological concepts.

However, the geography of psychological concepts is exceptionally irregular. Ridges that appear connected are separated by sudden crevasses, bodies of water that seem separate

are connected by channels, and fog lies on the swamps and bogs. The perils of misdescription are accordingly great:

Mere description is so difficult because one believes that one needs to fill out the facts in order to understand them. It is as if one saw a screen with scattered colour-patches, and said: the way they are here, they are unintelligible; they only make sense when one completes them into a shape. — Whereas I want to say: Here *is* the whole. (If you complete it you falsify it.) (RPP I §257; cf. §723))

Surface grammar in this domain is so deeply misleading because the forms of grammar make profoundly different concepts appear much more similar than they are. We think of knowledge as a state (like ignorance³³), of meaning something as a mental act or activity (like saying something), of seeing something as a mental act, like hallucinating, only with a cause that corresponds to the content of the act. In all such cases, we are misled by surface grammar. So we make the wrong comparisons. But, 'What appears at first sight to be homologous, we must not, if we seek for a deeper understanding, consider to be homologous. And we must be able to see as homologous things which, to a superficial appearance, do not appear to be' (MS 130, 83). Interestingly, he observes that this is also a method of mathematics. Presumably what he had in mind is, for example, that in topology a pyramid is more like a sphere than a doughnut is, or that in geometry a parabola is more like a circle than like a line. One must compare what looks like a jawbone with a foot (MS 134, 125) – thinking, not with talking to oneself, but with the expression with which one talks; meaning something, not with saying something, but with intending; knowing what one wants, not with knowing what another wants, but with having decided, and so on.

Often philosophers introduce a new use for a familiar word without even being aware of having done so, for example, by assimilating its use to that of another word (e.g. 'want' to 'wish'), or they construct certain uses for words – ascribing to them a far more elaborate use than they have (e.g. 'attitude'). Sometimes they try to follow up certain features of the ordinary use of a word to make it 'more consistent' (MS 130, 116 = RPP I §§51f.) – thereby falsely representing it (e.g. thinking to find an epistemic use for 'I know I am in pain', or supposing that the reason we do not say that whatever we see we also seem to see is because it is too obviously true to be worth saying). Philosophers commonly admit that the use they are introducing, of 'knowledge' for example, does not accord with ordinary usage, but insist that it is more important and more interesting than ordinary usage. 'But the philosophical concept', Wittgenstein noted, 'is derived from the common one through a variety of misunderstandings, and it reinforces those misunderstandings. It is not in the slightest bit interesting, except as a warning (MS 136, 94b = RPP II §289).

'We must take a concept as one finds it, and not want to refine it', Wittgenstein wrote (MS 137, 15a), 'Because it is not our business to modify it, to introduce a concept appropriate for certain purposes (as it is done in the sciences); rather, it is to understand it, that is, not to draw a false picture of it'. The goal is not a theory – how could it be? what would be the observations grounding such a philosophical theory? and what evidence would verify it (what *experimentum crucis* would confirm or disconfirm the existence of 'qualia', for example)? The task in philosophy of psychology is to give an overview of the conceptual scheme that we have, not to introduce an alternative one. It is to present the methods and techniques of

³³ As when we say 'She is in a blissful state of ignorance'. But ignorance is not a *mental* state, and knowledge is not a state of any kind. (One can be in a paralysed state, but not in a state of being able to walk.)

comparing and contrasting concepts and language-games. It is to teach us to find our way around this irregular landscape, and to fend for ourselves when confronted with conceptual unclarity and problems – in philosophy of psychology, in psychology itself and in cognitive neuroscience.

6. *Surveyable representations and philosophical method*

When reflecting on Wittgenstein's writings on philosophy of psychology after 1945, one must bear in mind the fact that one is looking at work in progress, not at finished work. With the exception of MS 144 and the lost typescript made from it (TS 234, the so called Part II of the *Investigations*), the materials are not even ordered. In fact what we have is raw material for a book, the scope and shape of which we do not know. We have little, if any, idea how Wittgenstein might have decided to arrange his materials or what guiding principle of arrangement he might have adopted – and perhaps he too had little idea. Nevertheless, the privilege of seeing the work in progress is instructive and illuminating.

One striking contrast between these materials, and the finished work of the *Philosophical Investigations*, is that, as already noted, the *Investigations* was Janus faced. It is no coincidence that Wittgenstein would have liked to see it published in a single volume together with the *Tractatus*, so that his new thoughts could be seen in the right light by contrast with, and against the background of, his old way of thinking – in which he now recognized grave mistakes (PI, Preface p. x). This dialectic, of course, provided a principle of arrangement for a significant part of the book. No such principle is in play in the reflections on the philosophy of psychology. He is not confronting his old ways of thinking about problems in the philosophy of psychology (that had already been done in the reflections on understanding, thinking, intentionality and meaning in the *Investigations*). Rather, he was exploring the field of psychological concepts, partly for their intrinsic interest, partly to resolve some deep problems and puzzles that caught his interest (like Moore's paradox of belief, or the paradoxes of aspect perception), and partly to extirpate a range of endemic errors and misconceptions. There is no evidence to suggest that after 1946 he saw any need to modify the conception of the goals and methods of philosophy that he had advanced in the *Investigations*. So we can assume, at least as a working hermeneutical hypothesis, that his raw writings on philosophy of psychology, despite their incompleteness and tentative character, exemplify his conception of the methods, limits and goals of philosophical investigation – not, of course, by way of finished work, but rather by way of procedure. That in turn serves to illuminate contentious aspects of his methodology and conception of philosophy.

Looked at from this point of view, it is evident that in his writings on the philosophy of psychology

(i) there are no theories (PI §109) – on the model of the hypothetico-deductive theories that characterize the natural sciences. Rather, his grammatical remarks sketch out fragments of the logical geography of locations and environments within the landscape of psychological concepts.

(ii) there are no theses (PI §128) – which assert that things *must* be thus and so as a condition of the possibility of our thinking or reasoning, on the model of the *Tractatus* and of Waismann's *Thesen* for the Vienna Circle that were based on it. Of course, his grammatical remarks are not *theses* – they describe *the nature* of the psychological phenomena under scrutiny. So, they are expressions of rules for the use of the constituent words, or, as one might also say, for the use of the concepts expressed (cf. PI §§371-3). Only gross misunderstanding would lead one to think that these are exclusive (cf. PI §370).

(iii) there is nothing hypothetical (PI §109), that might stand in need of empirical

confirmation or disconfirmation, or that might be more or less probable. The investigation is wholly a priori, and so too are the grammatical remarks the arrangement of which resolves philosophical problems. It is not a *hypothesis* that pain is a sensation, or that one can experience an aspect change without anything in the object perceived changing, or that one can speak quickly or slowly but cannot mean something quickly or slowly.

(iv) the only explanations are grammatical, i.e. the calling to mind (PI §127) of familiar rules for the use of words.

(v) nothing that is hidden from view plays any role in the grammatical explanations or elucidations (PI §126) – for were anything hidden from view, it could not play a role in the guidance, justification, correction and criticism of linguistic behaviour. The sense-determining rules for the use of expressions could no more be unknown to those who use them than what they see could be invisible to them. For what is unknown cannot fulfil the guiding, justifying and critical function that is intrinsic to rules. But there may well be *comparative features* of familiar rules for the use of words that one had not *realised*.

(vi) everything *in the grammar of psychological concepts* is left as it is (PI §124) – it is not the task of philosophy in general, or of philosophy of psychology in particular, to reform language or to introduce a novel (logically more perfect) language. (Of course, that does not *preclude* introducing new *classificatory concepts* in terms of which to order our existing psychological concepts, although, as we have seen, at the end of the day, the only novel concept Wittgenstein brought into play is that of ‘genuine duration’.) What is *not* ‘left as it is’ are the conceptual confusions rife in philosophy of psychology, on the one hand, and in empirical psychology on the other (PI, p. 232) – these are ruthlessly exposed.

(vii) the methods of clarification are descriptive (PI §109) – the uses of psychological expressions that are, for one reason or another, problematic is described, the presuppositions of their use teased out, the contexts of their use elaborated, and the language games in which they are embedded characterized. To be sure, the choice of the grammatical propositions selected is constrained by the philosophical, conceptual, problems at hand.

(viii) the problems are solved by the *arrangement* of what we already know (PI §109), namely the relevant rules for the use of the words that are the source of our difficulties. The arrangement of grammatical remarks is guided by the goal of giving us an overview of the grammar of the problematic concept in its conceptual field, enabling us to see affinities and differences of which we may well have been unaware. That is why, whereas the appropriate response to a scientific discovery may be ‘Goodness me, who would have thought of that!’, the response to a philosophical insight should be ‘Of course! I should have thought of that’.

(ix) the ordering of grammatical remarks is neither arbitrary nor person-relative, but rather problem-relative. It is guided by the goal of providing a *surveyable representation* of the problematic concept that will provide the key to the solution or dissolution of the problems or puzzles that arise.

We should view Wittgenstein’s struggles with the philosophy of psychology between 1946 and 1949 as the endeavour to collect grammatical materials for surveyable representations of problematic psychological concepts. These do not add to our knowledge of the world, but only to our understanding of the forms of our thought and talk about the world. They provide us with a map of Treasure Island. But the only treasure is the island – and the map.³⁴

³⁴ I am grateful to Hanoch Ben-Yami, Yuval Lurie and Joachim Schulte for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.